Chapter 15: Public Utilities by Baer, Herbert
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1960 Article 18
1-1-1960
Chapter 15: Public Utilities
Herbert Baer
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
Recommended Citation




A. COURT DECISIONS 
§15.1. Review of decisions permitting curtailment of passenger 
service: Standing to seek. In City of Newton v. Department of Public 
Utilities1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that proceedings under 
G.L., c. 160, §§128 and 128A, in which the railroad had requested au-
thority to discontinue certain passenger train service and the abandon-
ment of certain stations, were adjudicatory proceedings under G.L., c. 
30A, §1(1),2 at least as to the railroad, and that the question of stand-
ing to seek judicial review of decisions of the department was governed 
by G.L., c. 25, §5.3 The appellant city had to show that it was per-
mitted to be, or had a right to be, treated as a party in the proceedings 
before the department, and that it was "aggrieved." The city's petition 
failed to allege sufficient facts to show that it had been a party. 
Town of Wilmington v. Department of Public Utilities)4 decided 
during the 1960 SURVEY year, presented substantially the same ques-
tions of law. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the town did not 
come within G.L., c. 30A, §1(3) (b), since it was not entitled by con-
stitution or statute to participate in the proceedings; but it found, 
however, allegations in the petition, not present in the Newton case, 
that the department had impliedly allowed the town to intervene and 
concluded that the town was, therefore, a party under Section 1(3) (c). 
The Court thus reached the question, not decided in the Newton case, 
of whether the town was an "aggrieved party in interest." Basing its 
decision principally upon its conclusion that there ought to be an 
opportunity for adversary representation in these proceedings, it held 
that a town can be "an aggrieved party in interest" under Section 5. 
HERBERT BAER is Counsel of the Department of Public Utilities and a member of 
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§15.1. 1339 Mass. 535, 160 N.E.2d 108 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§Il.l. 
2 Section 1(1) defines "adjudicatory proceedings" under the State Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
3 Section 5 governs rulings and orders of the Department of Public Utilities and 
appeals therefrom. 
4340 Mass. 432,165 N.E.2d 99 (1960). 
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The decision appears to leave the test of whether a town is aggrieved 
to the discretion of the department but suggests that this discretion 
is subject to judicial review. This reasoning is somewhat difficult to 
reconcile with the Court's earlier finding that a town has no right to 
be a party within the meaning of Section 1(3) (b). Moreover, the de-
cision gives little guidance to the department as to the standards to 
be applied in determining whether a town is an aggrieved party. The 
implication is clear that every city and town is not necessarily entitled 
to become a party, but whether the test is merely the presence of a 
station within the town or whether the number of passengers, the 
number of stations, the size of the city or town in relation to the 
railroad patronage, or similar considerations are to be given weight 
is not clear. 
§15.2. Review of decisions permitting curtailment of passenger 
service: Standards to be applied. In addition to the procedural issue; 
the Newton casel was the first judicial review of the standards to be 
applied by the department in proceedings of this type. The basic con-
tention of the city was that the department could not permit a re-
duction in service in the absence of proof that the service operated at 
an "above-the-rail loss." Above-the-rail expenses are those associated 
with the operation of the train, such as wages, fuel, and car repairs; 
they do not include the maintenance-of-way expenses and capital ex-
penses. They have been used by railroads in many train discontinu-
ance cases because they frequently show a deficit without reference 
to the other expenses. The department has never held that below-the-
rail expenses were irrelevant. Moreover, the department has consist-
ently held that financial considerations are not- in themselves sufficient 
grounds to justify or preclude service reductions. The existence of 
a profit or loss is only one consideration among many in the ultimate 
decision of the public necessity for the service. 
The Court found that although the applicable statutes do not 
specify a standard to be applied by the department, the proper test 
is the existence of public convenience and necessity for the service 
and that the department is not limited to the narrow issues of finance 
but "is entitled to consider any relevant aspects of transportation of 
passenger and freight within the Commonwealth. . .. It was not 
obliged to find . . . in any particular manner or by any single formula 
the precise amount of an avoidable cost. . .. It properly could give 
attention to general transportation conditions on these and other 
Massachusetts railroads." 2 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§15.3. Electric and gas utilities: Rates. The Department of Public 
Utilities has long followed the principle that the rate base of public 
utilities should include only property, used and useful, in the utility 
§15.2. 1339 Mass. 535, 160 N.E.2d 108 (1959). 
2339 Mass. at 547-548,160 N.E.2d at 116. 
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business.1 The application of this principle has led to the exclusion 
of unfinished construction from the rate base. The heavy construction 
budgets of the companies in recent years have resulted in balances in 
the Unfinished Construction Account that have become large enough 
to be significant in relation to the total finished plant. As a result, 
repeated efforts have been made to persuade the department to con-
sider inclusion of unfinished construction in the rate base. It is argued 
that unfinished construction is dedicated to public use, since it is in-
vested in response to public demand for increased service and will 
within a short time become part of the plant actually operated in the 
utility business. 
In Boston Edison CO.,2 the department again considered and rejected 
the contention that unfinished construction should be included in the 
rate base, stating: 
The Company's method seeks to charge present customers for 
capital cost of plant which future customers will enjoy. Such a 
return would provide an advantage to the Company, which is not 
typical of private enterprise generally. Emphasis on the fact that 
the property will ultimately be devoted to public service tends 
to obscure the fact that the owners in any private enterprise invest 
new capital on the expectation of obtaining a future profit and 
do not expect a return until the investment is completed and is 
offering a service to the public. We do not see any reason why 
the investors in a public utility should be treated differently. 
In the same case the department also discussed its method of com-
puting the cost of capital, which forms a basis for determining a reason-
able rate of return. The company's expert witness had testified that 
cost of capital should be based upon the rates that the company would 
be required to pay for its various types of securities if the company's 
total securities were issued in the current market. He recognized 
that many of the company's then-outstanding securities were in the 
form of contractual securities, such as long-term bonds and preferred 
stock with a fixed cost to the company not depending upon current 
market conditions. He refused to give any weight to these "experi-
enced" costs on the ground that total reliance upon experienced 
costs, when they are below "current" costs, would have the effect of pe-
nalizing the stockholders; any new issue of long-term debt, for example, 
at the higher rate, would tend to reduce the return to common stock-
holders below that found to be reasonable. 
The department stated its position as follows: 
The Company's witness is correct, it seems to us, in contend-
ing that total reliance on experienced costs is unsound. The weak-
ness in his approach, however, is the assumption that the only 
§15.3. 1 Re New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., D.P.U. 8181 (March. 
1949). 
2 D.P.U. 12899 (Aug. 1959). 
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alternative is total reliance on current costs. This assumption 
ignores the method which this Department has long followed and 
discussed at length most recently in Re New England Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, DPU 12107, January 30, 1958. In brief, 
that method is based on a weighted average of the experienced 
and current costs of contractual securities, thus recognizing that 
new issues must be financed at current costs but avoiding what 
seems to us the wholly unsound practice of permitting the com-
pany to earn a return on outstanding contractual securities in 
excess of what the company is obliged to pay. 
In the application of this theory the department typically estimates 
the amount of new contractual capital that the company will issue in 
the reasonably foreseeable future and the proportion of this amount 
that will be issued in each form of security. The total cost of capital 
is arrived at by an average of the cost of each type of capital, weighted 
in accordance with the relation between the amount of outstanding 
securities in each class and the total amount of securities outstanding 
of all classes. The cost of each type of capital is in turn an average 
of current and experienced cost, weighted in accordance with the re-
lationship between estimated new capital and total capital of each 
class. In the Boston Edison Co. case, for example, it was estimated 
that approximately $25 million in new bonds would be issued and that 
approximately $160 million in bonds would be outstanding after this 
issue. The current bond rate received a weight of 25/160; experienced 
cost received a weight of 135/160. 
Although debt and preferred stock costs are arrived at by weighting 
past experienced rates and current rates, the same procedure is not 
used in arriving at the cost of equity capital. As the department stated 
in the Boston Edison Co. case: 
It is a necessary corollary of the fact that there are no con-
tractual costs associated with common stock, that its "cost" de-
pends upon investor expectations which in turn depend upon 
market conditions as they obtain from time to time. Thus the 
term "cost of equity" itself has little meaning except in the terms 
of current market appraisals. To determine a current return on 
equity on the basis of returns experienced in the past rather than 
on an evaluation of the current market seems to us to be incon-
sistent with the cost of capital theory. 
§15.4. Water utilities: Rates. In Edgartown Water Co.,t the De-
partment of Public Utilities faced a novel issue with respect to the 
proper rate base and made a qualification of the general principle 
that it should include property used and useful in the utility business. 
The evidence indicated that there was in existence, on an original 
cost basis, a utility plant, including materials and supplies, amounting 
to approximately $127,000 after deduction of a depreciation reserve 
and contributions for construction. There was no question that this 
§15.4. t D.P.U. 13045 (Feb. 1960) 
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plant was actually in service and the company contended that it was 
a proper rate base under the principles long followed by the depart-
ment. 
An unusual feature of the company's operations was that it col-
lected its entire annual revenue in advance of providing service. 
These advanced revenues had been carried by the company in its 
Surplus Account, but it was conceded that the advanced revenue 
should have been carried as a deferred credit. The elimination of 
this sum from the Surplus Account resulted in total capital, including 
outstanding notes and bonds, of approximately $121,000. The rate 
base, if calculated on the basis of the cost of plant and materials and 
supplies actually in service, would, therefore, be in excess of the in-
vestment in the business by capital contributors. The department 
held that this excess was, in effect, contributed by the customers of the 
company and was analogous to contributions for construction that are 
on occasion made by customers who desire a utility to make an un-
usually long extension. If this extension would result in a permanent 
loss financed entirely by the utility, arrangements are sometimes made 
for the customer to bear a portion of the cost of the extension. The 
portion of total plant thus contributed by customers has always been 
treated as a deduction in arriving at a rate base, on the theory that cus-
tomers should not be required to pay a return to the company on prop-
erty that they themselves supply. While the excess of net plant over 
capital in the Edgartown Water Co. case was not a contribution related 
to specific items of plant, the department felt that it was a contribution 
of customers generally to the construction of the plant and that the 
excess should not be included as part of the rate base upon which the 
customers would be required to pay a return to the company. The de-
partment stated: 
Stated another way, the return which a utility company is en-
titled to receive in excess of the cost of service is that amount 
which is a fair return on the capital which has been hired for the 
Company to perform service. It is a payment for another type 
of cost of service, namely, the capital cost. Where the Company 
experiences no cost, however, there is no reason to charge the 
customers for a return on capital. In the present case, it is ap-
parent that a portion of the capital has been supplied by the rate 
payers, and with respect to this portion, no return should be per-
mitted. 
§15.5. Gas companies: Rates. In 1955,1 the Department of Public 
Utilities promulgated a rule applicable to gas companies permitting 
them to file as part of their rates a so-called "Purchase Price Gas Ad-
justment Clause," which provides that gas distributing companies may 
pass on to their customers increases or decreases in the wholesale 
price of gas purchased from natural gas pipeline companies. These 
clauses are analogous to the better-known "Fuel Clause" of electric 
§15.5. 1 Re Worcester Gas Light Co. and Springfield Gas Light Co., D.P .U. 11209, 
11210, 11221 (May, 1955). 
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companies, but they require thirty days notice of adjustments to the 
department within which time the department may act to suspend, 
pending investigation, the effectiveness of the adjustment. At the 
time the rule was promulgated the department stated that its policy 
would be to approve such adjustments "unless current figures filed as 
part of the notice increase indicate net earnings larger than would be 
normally appropriate in the case of gas distributing companies .... " 
In Lowell Gas CO.2 the data submitted to the department indicated 
a rate of return of less than six per cent, and the department found 
that this return was not sufficient to require the company to absorb 
increases in the price of gas purchased by it. It was noted, however, 
that six per cent return was computed after a charge to operating ex-
pense and credit to a reserve for contingencies of an amount of income 
tax that, although not actually paid by the company, would be as-
sessed against it if it were filing tax returns as a single company not 
part of the consolidation. The approval of the purchased gas price 
adjustment was conditioned upon a requirement that the company 
continue to make this charge until further ordered and that the re-
serve could not be used for any purpose other than the payment of 
federal income taxes. 
§15.6. Water utilities: Service. Chapters 164 and 165 of the Gen-
eral Laws contain no provisions requiring companies planning to en-
gage in gas, electric, and water business to obtain a franchise, other 
than permission of local authorities, to place poles, wires, or mains 
in the public streets. Chapter 164 defines an "electric company" as 
a "corporation organized ... for the purpose of ... selling ... 
electricity ... " The term "gas company" is similarly defined. Ac-
cordingly, although a company may be formed for the purpose of 
selling gas or electricity, the department obtains early jurisdiction over 
such a company since no securities may be issued until approved by 
the department. 
In Wylde Wood Water Works, Inc.1 a corporation organized for the 
purpose of entering the water business sought department approval 
for the initial issue of securities, on the theory that Chapter 165, ap-
plicable to water companies, required approval similar to that which 
would have been required under Chapter 164 for an electric company. 
An important difference exists between the two chapters with re-
spect to "company." Chapter 165 applies to a corporation "engaged 
in the distribution and sale of water ... and occupying public streets 
with its mains and pipes therefor." 2 Although leaving the question 
somewhat open, the department indicated that in its view Chapter 165 
applied only to companies already in the water business and that ap-
proval of a sale of securities prior to the commencement of business 
was not within its jurisdiction. 
§15.7. Telephone utilities: Service. The New England Telephone 
and Telegraph Company tariff on file with the Department of Public 
2 D.P.U. 111244 (March. 1960). 
§15.6. 1 D.P.U. 111191 (April.I960). 
2 G.L .• c. 165. §1. 
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Utilities provides "service will not be furnished when any law en-
forcement agency acting within its jurisdiction, advises that such serv-
ice is being used or will be used in violation of law." When the com-
pany receives such a notice from a law enforcement official, it removes 
service without any inquiry into the basis for the determination by 
the law enforcement agency. 
The application of ihis policy has resulted in a long series of cases 
in which the action of the telephone company has been protested on 
the ground that the police had. insufficient reason to make the determi-
nation that the service was being used illegally. 
The department has consistently held that the only question be-
fore it was whether the tariff provision was reasonable. General Laws, 
c. 273, §47, provides that telephone service that has been removed on 
account of illegal activity may not be reinstalled without the approval 
of law enforcement authorities "whether or not there has been a con-
viction." This language, the department has held, clearly indicates 
that the legislature intended that the police authorities should have 
the power to exercise discretion on the question whether telephone 
service should be removed. Neither the company nor the department 
is the appropriate agency for reviewing this exercise of the law en-
forcement agencies' discretion, and the department has stated that it 
would not judge as to the merits of the action of the police but would 
leave the parties to their judicial remedies.1 
In William F. Gallagher d/b/a Falmouth Airport,2 the department 
reviewed a telephone company refusal to provide a directory listing to 
the petitioner under the name "Falmouth Airport" on the ground that 
it would be confusing with a listing for the "Falmouth Municipal Air-
port." The department has jurisdiction over the listings, which are 
"regulations" and "practices" within the meaning of G.L., c. 159, §16. 
It was held that the company had no authority to set itself up as an 
arbiter of use of trade names by its customers. Unless the use of similar 
names would seriously affect telephone service the company is obligated 
to grant listings upon a nondiscriminatory basis. 
§15.8. Commercial motor vehicles: Rates. None of the statutes 
under which the Department of Public Utilities operates is explicit 
as to where the burden of proof lies in a rate case. The practice has 
always been to require a proponent of a rate to prove its lawfulness in 
cases in which a new rate filing has been suspended by the department 
for purposes of investigation. Since data on which a rate is based are 
within the possession of the proponent, and since he impliedly repre-
sents when he files a new rate that he has concluded on the basis of this 
data that the rate is a reasonable one, it is logical that he should carry 
the burden of proof. 
Different considerations are present when the proceeding is one 
involving a rate already in effect. General Laws, c. l59B, §6, provides 
that rates shall become effective not less than thirty days after filing. 
§15.7. 1 Re Casey's Main Event. D.P.V. 13192 (May. 1960); Antone DeMello. 
D.P.V. 12886 (Nov. 1959). 
2 D.P.V. 12912 (Sept. 1959). 
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During this thirty-day period, if a complaint is received, the department 
may, and customarily does, suspend the effective date of the rate, pend-
ing investigation. If no complaint is received, the department does 
not ordinarily suspend new rate filings. The department will conduct 
an investigation if a complaint is subsequently filed, but in Container-
ized Transport CO.I it held, for the first time, that the complainant must 
carry the burden of showing that the rate is unlawful. A new rate is 
frequently accompanied by a shift in transportation patterns and an 
investment in new equipment. The requirement that the burden then 
shifts to the complainant provides some degree of certainty upon which 
the proponent can rely. The opposite rule would permit harassment 
by other competitors. The department has expressly reserved decision 
upon the issue of burden of proof when an investigation into an already 
effective rate is undertaken upon motion by the department rather than 
on complaint. 
C. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
§15.9. Gas companies. Shortly after the commencement of con-
struction of high pressure natural gas pipelines in the Commonwealth, 
the Department of Public Utilities promulgated a safety code govern-
ing construction of those portions of these pipelines passing under pub-
lic ways. I In the years that followed the construction of the pipelines, 
many public ways have been built over already existing high pressure 
mains. Not only was there an increasing number of public ways lack-
ing the safety features of the original regulations, but also the construc-
tion process in the vicinity of high pressure mains was creating a dan-
ger of explosion. 
To remedy this situation, the Legislature enacted Section 76B of 
Chapter 164 of the General Laws,2 which authorized the department 
to promulgate a code, similar to the existing one, covering the con-
struction of public ways. The rules promulgated by the department3 
imposed the same standards with respect to depth of cover and casing 
of pipe as were present in the original regulations, but provision is 
made for the granting of a reduction in the depth of cover requirement 
providing construction is in accordance with specifications set forth in 
the regulations. As originally proposed, the regulations contained 
elaborate provisions with respect to cost estimates and payment of the 
cost of lowering and encasing pipe when necessary. The final regula-
tions eliminated these provisions and in their present form merely re-
quire the natural gas pipeline company to provide the person con-
structing the public wayan estimate of the cost of effecting compliance 
with the rules. . 
§15.8. I D.P.U. 13033 (May, 1960). 
§15.9. I D.P.U. 9734 (Revised Aug. 1958); D.P.U. 11725 (Dec. 1958). 
2 Added by Acts of 1958, c. 552. 
3 D.P.U. 12769 Oune, 1960). 
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